# Literature Populism Paper

**Concepts in the Social Sciences – POPULISM – Paul Taggert XXXXX**

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| **Page /**  **Concept** | **Quotation** |
| ***Introduction (p.1- 9)*** |  |
| p.1: Leaders | “Where it relies on leaders, it requires the most extraordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary of people.” |
| p.1: time of crisis | “Populism draws great support at times of crisis but, in practice, it is invariably reformist and incapable of offering fundamental ‘root and branch’ reform. “ |
| p.1: representative politics - problem | “Wherever there is representative politics, it is omnipresent as a potential movement or set of ideas to be drawn on by movements.” |
| p.1:populist movement: diffuse system | “Populist movements have systems of belief which are diffuse, they are inherently difficult to control and organize, they lack consistency, and their activity waxes and wanes with a bewildering frequency. “ |
| p.2: slippery concept | “It lacks features that would make it more tangible” |
| p.2: mercurial | characteristics = quintessentially mercurial (launenhaft) 🡪 “Fot these reasons, it is profoundly difficult to construct a generalized description, let alone a universal and comprehensive definition, of populism as an idea or as a political movement” |
| p.2: no perfect definition of populism | comparison Cinderella complex “The warning is clear: a search for the perfect fir for populism is both illusory and unsatisfying and will not lead to a happy ending. ” |
|  | six key themes that run through populism:   1. Populist as hostile (Feinde) to representative politics 2. Populists identifying themselves with an idealized heartland within the community they favour 3. Populism as an ideology lacking core values 4. Populism as a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis 5. Populism as containing fundamental dilemmas that make it self-limiting 6. Populism as a cameleon, adopting the colours of its environment |
| p.3: Eschewing (Meidend) complexity | “Eschewing the complexity of representative politics, populists advocate simplicity and directness in their politics. The accoutrements of representative politics, including parties and parliament, are all too often, for populists, distractions and unnecessary complications.” |
| p.3 conception of hertland | “Populism […] has implicit within conception of a heartland. This is a notion that is constructed through looking inward and backward: a world that embodies the collective ways and wisdom of people who construct it, usually with reference to what has gone before (even if that is idealized). “ |
| p.3: “the people” | Core = populated by the people, gives space for constructing their own world  the people = concept that is derived from a sense of heartland |
| p.4: lack of commitment to key values | lack of commitment to key values: “While other ideologies contain, either implicitly or explicitly, a focus on one or more values such as equality, liberty and social justice, populism is appropriated (verwendet) by such a wide range of political positions. “ |
| p.4: crisis | “the emergence of a crisis shakes populists out of their reluctance and into politics, and into an active defence of the heartland. The difficulty is that the crisis may be one in the imagination if the populist or it may be an economic and political crisis in the true sense of word. “ |
| p.4: tries to translate into simplicity | “Populism’s ambivalence about politics helps to explain why it is so often an episodic phenomenon. Eschewing the institutions, forms and patterns of representative politics, populism deliberately tries to translate the simplicity and plain talking of ordinary people into structures that are simple and direct.” |
| p.5: leaders | populist leaders create movements and parties to legitimate them. |
| p.6: agrarian populism | “looking at the Russian case, it is tempting to see the peasantry and the romanticizing of peasant life as the key to populism.“  🡪 extra Chapter on Russian case |
| p.6: new/modern populism | “And coming to Europe, the new populism of the far right becomes fundamentally urban and exclusionary” |
| Literature | Canovan 1981/1982: dividing populism up into different types |
| ***Definitions of Populism (Chapter 2)*** |  |
| p. 13: political movement \* charismatic leader | “[Di Tella] describes it as a ‘political movement based on mobilized but not yet autonomously organized popular sector, led by an elite rooted among the middle and upper echelons of society , and kept together by a charismatic , personalized link between leader and led ’ ” |
| p.13: development of society | “Populism is therefore. For Di Tella, a function of the process of development of societies as they move towards modernity” (Di Tella 1965, 1997) |
| p.13: poor vs. elite  zum verstehen lieber nochmal nachlesen | “populism is characterized by a sense of differentiation between those who are poor and those who are part of the elite and by the social characteristics of the supporting coalition. “ |
| p.14: industrialization | “Gavin Kitching places populism at the centre of his analysis of thinking about development. He argues that populism is a reaction to industrialization and is characterized by a championing (verfechten) of small-scale production and opposed to concentration of production (Kitching, 1989: 19-22) 🡪 focuses on peasant ideologies |
| reaction to quote of Kitching | it is too specific. “the concept of populism is developed to trace a continuity within a strand of thinking about political economy. ” Kitchen derives populism from what is developed and not from the impulse that causes this sort of thinking to develop.” |
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**POPULISM –A Very Short Introduction - Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser XXX**

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| p.4: populist appearance. amateurish political behavior | “A final approach considers populism predominantly as a folkloric style of politics, which leaders and parties employ to mobilize the masses.”  “In this understanding, populism alludes to amateurish and unprofessional political behavior that aims to maximize the media attention ad popular support.” |
| p.7: oppositions of populism | “And there are two direct opposites of populism: elitism and pluralism” |
| p.8: left or right populism, both exists | “Neither the employment of clientistic party-voter linkages nor the adherence to left or right politics is something that defines populism” |
| p.9: Shared identity | “Given that populism has the capacity to frame “the people” in a way that appeals to different constituencies and articulate their demands, it can generate a shared identity between different groups and facilitate their support for a common cause. “ |
| p.9: distinction the people vs. the elite | “In all cases the main distinction between “the people” and “the elite” is related to a secondary feature: political power, socioeconomic status and nationality, respectively. ” |
| p.10: common people are being excluded  🡪 unemployment!  and level of education | “[…] the notion of “the common people” vindicates the dignity and knowledge of groups who objectively or subjectively are being excluded from power due to their sociocultural and socioeconomic status.” |
| p.11: critique against establishment | ”[…] but it tries to mobilize this majority against a defines enemy (e.g. “the establishment”). This anti-elitist impetus goes together with a critique of institutions such as political parties, big organizations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of distorting the “truthful” links between populist leaders and “the common people” |
| p.11: detest the elite | Most populists not only detest the political establishment, but they also critique the economic elite, the cultural elite, and the media elite. All of those are portrayed as one homogenous corrupt group that works against the “general will” of the people.” |
| p.12: who are the elite | “[the elite] include most people who hold leading positions within politics, the economy, the media, and the arts.” |
| p.14: merging populism and nationalism | “ Finally, populism can be merged completely with nationalism, when the distinction between the people and the elite is both moral and ethnic. Here the elite are not just seen as agents of an alien power, they are considered alien themselves. ” |
| p.14: elite represents interest of the aliens = immigrants/minorities, ≠ people  xenophobic argument | “For example xenophobic populists in Europe often deinge the people in ethnic terms, excluding “aliens” (i.e. immigrants and minorities), but they do not argue that the elite are part of another ethnic group. They do argue, however, that the elite favors the interests of the immigrants over those of the native people. ” |
| p.16  the general will | “Populism’s monist and moral distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite reinforces the idea that a general will exists” |
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**Populismus: begriffshistorische und theoretische Bemerkungen – Paul Lucardie XXX**

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| p.21  Xeneophobia | „Populisten brauchen – so behaupten etwa Daniele Albertazzi und Duncan McDonnell, aber auch Paul Taggert – outgroups (meist Immigranten), die als Sündenbock dienen und gegen die sie das Volk mobilisieren können, ohne die Eliten immer direkt angreifen zu müssen.“ |
| p.27 | „ es sind mindestens drei Ursachenarten zu unterscheiden: sozial-strukturelle Bedingungen, politische Faktoren bzw. politische Gelegenheitsstrukturen und der Beitrag (Ressourcen) der neuen Bewegung selbst“ |
| p.27  Traditionalism <> Modernity | „Modernität bedeutet ständige Veränderung – technologisch, ökonomisch und kulturell. Diese Veränderung bringt Spannungen und Frustration mit sich.“ |
| p.27  Tradition | Wertewandel in der Oberschicht, Mittel- und Unterschicht halten an traditionellen Werten und Brauchtümern gest 🡪 Potential für populistische Proteste entsteht. |
| p.27  Bildung | Diplomlose unterschichtenhalten fest an Traditionen, an ihrer Muttersprache und an der einheimischen Kultur |
| p.28 – 29  Wähler pop. Parteien: eher traditionell | Theorie besagt, dass Wähler populistischer Parteien mehr traditionelle, weniger post moderne werte hegen: stehen der mutikulturellen + globalisierten Gesellschaft kritisch gegenüber. (Zitat: E. Ivarsflaten: What Unites Right-Wing populists in Western Europe(2007)) |
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**In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe (Cas Mudde) XXX**

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| **p.215: Agrarian populism** | **“Strive for the preservation of small family farms by founding co-operatives, for strengthening (rural) communities, and self-governance” (Piccone and Ulmen 1995)** |
| p.227  no compromise in politics | “post communist politics is to a large extent a struggle of good against evil, of all or nothing, in which compromise is not accepted” |
| p.231  eastern Europe vs. western Europe | “Populism nevertheless plays a much more prominent role in contemporary Eastern European politics than in the West” |
| **political populism????** |  |
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**Europeanisation and Post-Peasant Populism - Juraj Buzalka (2008) XXX**

I argue that since the enlargement of European Union in 2004 in new member countries have been developing patterns of reactionary politics growing out of what I characterize as post-peasant populism.

The key for understanding this politics in New Europe, especially of the growth of its extreme form, must be analyzed particularly in relation to legacy of socialist modernization and specific effects of ‘great transformation’ under European integration. The major empirical focus is on the bulk of citizens who are connected to the countryside and feel that real power in society shall be defined and based there. Rustically romantic, but truly calculative followers of post-socialist capitalism, they make good sense of life in advanced European Union.

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| **p. 757:**  **political parties in Poland**  **(maybe put a left right scale as image?)** | 1. **Catholic-conservative** - Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice) = Pis 2. **2 nationalist-populist parties**, Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Self-defence of the Polish Republic) and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) 3. **conservative-liberal** Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) 4. **strong agrarian basis and deep roots in south east Poland** Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peaople’s Party): 5. **political left:** Lewica I Demokraci (Left and Democrats) |
| **from agrarian world to post-socialism** |  |
| p. 759:  politics and religion | “The strength of religion during nationalisation is demonstrated by the fact that the main people successfully able to mobilise peasant societies not least because they spoke in the vernacular were church employees” |
| p.759:  church and politics | “Roman Catholic Church was one of the few threads of continuity in Poland's past and it was always part of the world of Polish politics” (citation of (Davies 2005, p.) |
| p.759  traditions and religion | “past, invented a new and seemingly internationalist ideology based on an alliance between workers and farmer.” 🡪 strengthened the peasant imaginary in Poland (traditions)- folklore Religion connects everyone in Poland |
| p.759  church and religion | Catholic Chruch opposing the communist regime until 1989, significantly influenced the new moral order afterwards |
| p.760 | 🡪 traditional culture is enforced, central importance of family farm , supporting peasant |
| p.761  agrarian traditions | Memories of the peasant past are transmitted across generations, from peasant grandparents to their grandchildren, some of then university educated. ed. This type of memory is observable in everyday life, in people's worldviews as expressed in narratives that nourish a kind of peasant nostalgia. |
| p.761  traditions+ | peasant world + religious world still has power to influence political positions through traditions = driving forces of populism  (together with structurally positioned power relations) |
| **Populism in Eastern Europe** |  |
| p.761 | three main social features link populism with Catholicism:   1. the preminence and defence of the patriarchal family and a rigid moral order 2. complicated obsession with the nation 3. their traditions   many chruchmen like to link themselves with the people, and “oppressed people” |
| p.762 | Many religious leaders + populists share the safeguarding of traditions, fear the loss of traditional character of people, their national identity and their pre-industrial moral purity |
| p.762 | because the church also fear the loss of traditions in Eastern Europe, populism legitimates itself through an alliance with it,  🡪 many religious leaders support populists because for their care of traditions |
| p.764  unemployment/ less education | after socialism, church provided care for people in need: mostly unemployed such as in South-East Poland  defense of the “little people’s shops”  Anti capitalism, Anti-West  🡪 Populism  🡪 lesser education 🡪 lesser jobs, 🡪 more connected to church |
| **Europeanisation and populism** |  |
| p.768 | European multicultural polocies and regional development fostering tourism/ transnational migration🡪 gives rise to a particular political mobilization |

**“The Past is Never Dead”- Identity, Class and Voting Behavior in Contemporary Poland (K. Jasiewicz) XXX**

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| p.491  religion | “the best predictor of voting behavior is one’s religiosity” |
| p.491 | \*Data is from Polish General Election Study 2007 |
| p.492:  catholic traditions | “what sets Poland apart from both the post-communist cluster and societies of the West is the attachment of her people to the traditional system of authority. The author associates these traditional attitudes with the influence of Catholic traditions”. |
| p.494  religiousity | “As documented by several authors (see grabowsk 2004; grabowska and Szawiel 2001; Jasiewicz 2003; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Szawiel 1999; Szczerbiak 2001; Tworzecki 1996, 2003; Wade, Lavelle, and groth 1995), throughout the 1990s the best predictor of voting behavior in Poland was not one’s economic situation or social position but one’s religiosity (understood here as intensity of one’s religious beliefs and practices).” |
| p.495  religiousity | “the more religious people were (which can be measured either by self-assessment or by frequency of participation in religious services), the more likely they were to display euro-skeptical attitudes (Jasiewicz 2004).” |
| p.498  only statement about national elections can maybe not directly be associated with elections in 2014 | “The better educated, the younger, the affluent, the urban dwellers—in short, the likely euro-enthusiasts—tended to vote for PO and Tusk; the less educated, the older, the poorer, the rural dwellers—those prone to euro-skepticism—tended to vote for PiS and Kaczyński.” |
| p.500  PiS = populist  explanation why | “even more importantly, PiS drew to the polls almost two million of new voters. The message sent by the PiS—be it its anti-communism, its euro-skepticism, its law-and-order appeal, or, in short, its populism—still resonates well with substantial segments of Polish society.” |
| p.500  fear of the new  => maybe xenophobic variable ? | “People may, for instance, object to european integration not because they are devout Catholics and reject the allegedly overly secularized europe but because they live in the countryside and work on a farm and feel threatened by the competition from French or Austrian farmers or because they feel too old and poorly pre- pared to cope with the forthcoming changes. The reverse relationship is also conceivable: the old, poorly educated peasants may oppose the european Union because of their deep religiosity and a genuine rejection of the libertarian and mate- rialist West.” |
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Satisfaction with democracy??? (= protest voters)

Trust in the legal system (entering textes on theory)

**The Specter Haunting Europe – Populsim and Protest in Poland – Joanna Fomina and Jaeck Kucharczyk XXXX**

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| p. 58 | PiS populism = “a cultural backlash . . . against long-term ongoing so- cial change.” Pippa Noris |
| p.58 | “Populism may be broadly defined as “a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent ‘the people’s’ direct rule.” “  **Citation in Citation !!! 2**  **1. Pippa Norris, “It’s Not Just Trump: Authoritarian Populism Is Rising Across the West; Here’s Why,” Washington Post, Monkey Cage blog, 11 March 2016.** |
| p.58 | In its authoritarian dimension, this populism seeks in Poland and elsewhere to undermine the “universality of democracy and . . . to erode liberal-democratic norms, replacing them with new counter norms that emphasize ‘state security, civilizational diversity, and traditional values’”  **Citation in Citation 3**  **2. Anton Pelinka, “Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology,” in Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral, Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 3.** |
| p.59 | After European elections:  “Analysts had begun to regard PiS as unelectable, and dismissed its authoritarian longings and conservative social ideology as lacking ap- peal outside older, less educated, and poorer sections of Polish society.” |
| p.65 | Once in power, Law and Justice found itself under pressure from the Church and other core supporters who expected it to take action on their high-priority issues. |

**France in the End of Days – NYTimes – Roger Cohen XXXX**

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| p.1  Le Pen/ FN and its goals | **“**she says she will take France out of the euro, the shared European currency, and restore the franc. Exit from the European Union could follow. This would constitute an economic and political rupture ” |
| p.3  FN has exploited the loss | “This sense of dispossession, of loss, is what the National Front has exploited: loss of identity, jobs, national borders; loss of faith in a corrupt political system.” |
| p.3 | “We are at home!” — is the party’s strange battle cry, chanted at every rally. |
| p.4 | He cites a poll conducted in 2014 by the Ipsos research firm that found that 74 percent of French workers felt they were no longer “at home”; 74 percent saw globalization as a threat (while 68 percent of managers saw it as an opportunity). |
| p.4  from antisemitism to nationalsim | “party by shedding its Fascist, anti­Semitic antecedents (Jean­Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father, called the Holocaust “a detail” of history) and replacing it with France­first economic nationalism” |
| p.5 unstable labor market | To find jobs for immigrants, you need an open and flexible labor market. But the comprehensive French welfare state — financed by mandatory contributions for pensions, health and unemployment benefits that push up wage costs — tends toward inflexibility. |
| p.5  youth unemployment 🡪 Young people voting for nationalist party !!! Dates from 2017 | Youth unemployment stands around 25 percent. Over 31 percent of gross domestic product is spent on health, unemployment and other benefits, compared to 24.6 percent in Germany. |
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**The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah (Ausgestoßene )to Republican Democratic Contender? – Aurielien Mondon XXXX**

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| p.302 | “Le Pens had succeeded in moving their party closer to being a mainstream contender.” |
| p.304  crisis has always been a central theme | “Crisis has always been a central theme to the extreme right (Mudde 2007, 205–210; Taggart 2000), and played a key part in FN campaigns.” |
| p.304 | “Four years on and in the aftermath of a global recession, it was clear that Le Pen and her party would take advantage of the state of panic present in Europe. To launch her campaign, she warned:” |
| p.305 | “c’est vrai que dans une socie´te´en crise, l’immigration est un proble ` me’ (Guaino 2012). For Minister of the Interior, Claude Gue´ant, talking about immigration was not playing on the FN’s ﬁeld; it was being ‘attentive to the population’.” |
| p.305 | “‘Without borders, there is no civilisation.’” |
| p.305  Xenophobic | “Yet Gueant refused the association of his party’s stance with ‘xenophobia’; instead, he stated that the French ‘veulent que la France reste la France’” |
| p.305 | “but gave every French person permission to express their prejudice (ethnic, religious, racial or even gender) in whatever manner they chose, for all they defended was their love of France.” |
| p.306 | the extreme-right electorate appeared to have abandoned the ‘copy’ and moved back to the ‘original’, as many within the extreme- right party had predicted (Le Pen and Doucet 2010; Lemarie´2011). |
| p.308  FN = Anti-Muslim | “As the election drew closer, Le Pen made it increasingly clear that she was targeting the Muslim population, and that her republican and secularist stance was little more than a facade (Mondon 2013a, 91–92).” |
| p.309  Islamophobe | “she placed under suspicion all the asylum-seekers trying to reach Europe by sea but also anyone with a Muslim background” |
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**Explaining the Rise of the Front National to Electroral Prominence: Multi-Faceted or Contradictory Models? – Brigitte Beauzamy XXX**

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| p.178  age and gender | Falter looked for explanations of the RRP vote in the Federal Republic of Germany - factors: gender (women vote less for populist party), age (these parties appeal mostly to youth and older people). |
| p.179  working class | 2012 presidential campaign confirmed that working class + active voters were more likely to express sympathy with the FN than would |
| p.179  unemployment | modernization’s losers thesis: (term coined by Hans-Georg Betz 1993 and 1994) = impact of unemployment and progressive marginalization of the working class in post industrialized states |
| p.179  socio-economic classes | He (Bonnetain, 2004) concludes that socio-economic factors, such as unemployment, have a significant impact on the FN vote. |
| p.179  Xenophobic | from previous research done on voting electorate :  “the electorate of the Front National appear much more xenophobic than the average voters (70)”.  (Bréchon and Mitra (1992: 68)) |
| p.180  gender differneces | In her study of the psycho-sociological factors impacting FN adhesion: men: tend to like law and order arguments appeal to men, anti-Semitic arguments preffered by Catholic female and rather subdued (subdued) members. |
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France:

Socioeconomic – unemployment

Xenophobia: by FN program p.305 – aurelien Mondon

Isalmophobia: Aurelien Mondon

Education - Beauzamy

Generally: no trust in the legal system

**A new era for French far right politics? Comparing the FN under two Le Pens\*\*-- Michelle Hale Williams\***

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| p.680  from father to daughter – FN change after Le Pen – Le Pen Change | “However, in 2011, with the first party leadership transition passing the torch from father to daughter, national attention has turned to the FN once again. Marine Le Pen appears to be repositioning and refocusing the FN.” |
| p.680 | party has been developed to a new breed/ brand |
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